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Case Comments
Constitutional Law: Delayed Search of Accused's Vehicle
Without Warrant Reasonable Under Fourth Amendment
Defendant was convicted in a California state court for selling heroin. Evidence was introduced at trial which had been
seized from defendant's automobile while it was in police custody. Petitioner appealed, claiming that the evidence should
have been excluded since it was seized by police without a
warrant, violating the fourth amendment's protection from unreasonable search and seizure. The California District Court of
Appeal agreed with petitioner but held that admission of the
evidence was harmless error as it did not result in a miscarriage
The California Supreme Court declined to hear
of justice.'
2
The United States Supreme Court sustained the
the case.
validity of the search, holding that a search of an automobile is
reasonable within the meaning of the fourth amendment if it is
closely related to the reason the accused is arrested and the
reason the car is impounded and is being retained. Cooper v.
California,386 U.S. 58 (1967).
The fourth amendment provides that the security against unreasonable search and seizure applies to persons, houses, papers,
and effects. 3 This protection has been extended by interpreta1. The Supreme Court did not address itself to this issue because
they decided that no error existed. However, the applicability of the
California harmless-error constitutional provision to alleged federal
constitutional error was decided on the same day in the companion case
of Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967). The Court, citing the
standard established in Fahy v. Connecticut, 375 U.S. 85 (1963), held
that the federal standards of harmless error must be used in determining whether a violation of a federal constitutional right has contributed to a conviction in a state court.
2. This fact had no bearing on the United States Supreme Court's
authority to review the case. The Supreme Court has stated that:
Whenever the highest court of a state by any form of decision
affirms or denies the validity of a judgment of an inferior court,
over which it by law can exercise appellate authority, the jurisdiction of this court to review such decision, if it involves a
Federal question, will, upon a proper proceeding, attach.
Williams v. Bruffy, 102 U.S. 248, 255 (1880). See Minneapolis, St. P &
S. Ste. M. Ry. v. Rock, 279 U.S. 410 (1929) (right of Court to hear case
when state supreme court denied review); Gregory v. McVeigh, 90 U.S.
(23 Wall.) 294, 306.
3.

U.S. CoNsT. amend. IV specifically provides:

The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures,
shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon
probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particu-
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tion to include a business office, 4 a store,5 a hotel room, an
apartment,7 and an automobile.8 Although initially the right to
have illegally seized evidence excluded from trial was applicable
only to the federal courts,9 this right was later made applicable
to state courts under the due process clause of the fourteenth
amendment. 10 The fourth amendment implicitly provides that
a search pursuant to a warrant issued upon probable cause is
larly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or
things to be seized.
In Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914), the Supreme Court held
that in a federal prosecution the fourth amendment barred the use of
evidence secured through an illegal search and seizure.
4. See, e.g., Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S.
385, 392 (1920), where the Court stated: "The essence of a provision
forbidding the acquisition of evidence in a certain way is that not
merely evidence so acquired shall not be used before the Court but that
it shall not be used at all." See also Fraenkel, Concerning Searches and
Seizures, 34 HARv. L. REV. 361 (1921); Comment, 33 HARv. L. REv. 869
(1920).
5. Amos v. United States, 255 U.S. 313 (1921). But see Davis v.
United States, 328 U.S. 582, 592-93 (1946) (distinguishing Amos).
6. Lustig v. United States, 338 U.S. 74 (1949); see Feldman v.
United States, 322 U.S. 487, 494 (1944) (Black, J., dissenting); Note,
Federal Courts' Control of Illegal Conduct of State Officers, 42 ATINN.
L. REv. 121 (1957).
7. Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257 (1960). The Court, speaking through Mr. Justice Frankfurter stated:
In a doubtful case, when the officer does not have clearly convincing evidence of the immediate need to search, it is most
important that resort be had to a warrant, so that the evidence
in the possession of the police may be weighed by an independent judicial officer, whose decision, not that of the police,
may govern whether liberty or privacy is to be invaded.
Id. at 270-71.
8. Rios v. United States, 364 U.S. 253 (1960); Gambino v. United
States, 275 U.S. 310 (1927); Note, Search and Seizure of an Automobile
Incident to an Arrest for an Offense Other Than a Traffic Violation, 31
Mo. L. REv. 436 (1966).
9. Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206 (1960); Schwartz v. Texas,
344 U.S. 199 (1952); Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949). But see
Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952). See also Allen, Federalism
and the Fourth Amendment: A Requiem for Wolf, 1961 Sus'm.a COURT
REV. 1; Allen, The Wolf Case: Search and Seizure, Federalism and the
Civil Liberties, 45 U. ILL. L.F. 1 (1950); Kamisar, Wolf and Lustig Ten
Years Later: Illegal State Evidence in State and FederalCourts, 43 MINN.
L. Rrr. 1083 (1959).
10. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961). The Court specifically rejected the Wolf rule on the rationale that time and practical application had rendered the Wolf decision unworkable in the face of the
overriding concerns of justice espoused by the fourth and fourteenth
amendments. See Day & Berkman, Search and Seizure and the Exclusionary Rule: A Re-examination in the Wake of Mapp v. Ohio, 13
W. REs. L. REv. 56 (1961); Traynor, Mapp v. Ohio at Large in the
Fifty States, 1962 DuKE L.J. 319; Comment, 42 B.U.L. REV. 119 (1962);
Comment, 30 FoHAnAm L. REV. 173 (1961).
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CASE COMMENTS

constitutionally permissible and until 1950,11 it was generally
assumed that only searches conducted with a valid warrant were
2

reasonable.1

The Supreme Court has, however, recognized exceptions to
the general rule in cases involving movable vehicles and searches
incident to a lawful arrest. These departures have been justified on the common-law grounds of a necessary and implied
exception to the amendment.' 3 Recognizing that a vehicle can
be quickly removed from the locality or jurisdiction in which a
warrant must be sought, the Court has held that where an arresting officer has probable cause to believe that a vehicle is carrying contraband or illegal merchandise, he need not obtain a
warrant to search.' 4 Similarly, warrantless searches incident to
arrest have been justified to afford the police a method of selfprotection, to prevent the escape of the suspect, and to mitigate
against the possible destruction of the evidence. 15 It has been held,
11. See Rabinowitz v. United States, 339 U.S. 56 (1950).

Mr. Jus-

tice Minton, speaking for the Court stated:
A rule of thumb requiring that a search warrant always be
procured whenever practicable may be appealing from the vantage point of easy administration. But we cannot agree that
this requirement should be crystallized into a sine qua non to
the reasonableness of a search ....

The judgment of the offi-

cers as to when to close the trap on a criminal committing a
crime in their presence or who they have reasonable cause to
believe is committing a felony is not determined solely upon
whether there was time to procure a search warrant. Some
flexibility will be accorded law officers engaged in daily battle with criminals for whose restraint criminal laws are essential.
It is appropriate to note that the Constitution does not say
that the right of the people to be secure in their persons should
not be violated without a search warrant if it is practicable for
the officers to procure one. The mandate of the Fourth Amendment is that the people shall be secure against unreasonable
searches.
Id. at 65.
12. See id. at 70 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting); J. LANDYNsia, SEARcH
A
SEIzus AND TH SuPraEmE CouRt 109 (1966); cf. Trupiano v. United
States, 334 U.S. 699 (1948); Agnello v. United States, 269 U.S. 20, 32
(1925).
13. See J. LANDYNsxi, supra note 12; Carroll v. United States, 267
U.S. 132, 154 (1925); cf. Rodriguez-Gonzalez v. United States, 378 F.2d
256 (9th Cir. 1967).
In the recent case of Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294 (1967), the
Court permitted a warrantless search prior to an arrest where police
officers pursued a suspected armed felon into a house. Reasoning
that the situation necessitated the search, the Court stated "the exigencies of the situation made that course imperative . . . ." Id. at 298.
14. Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925). See also Brinegar
v. United States, 338 U.S. 160 (1949); Scher v. United States, 305 U.S.
251 (1938); Husty v. United States, 282 U.S. 694 (1931).
15. Preston v. United States, 376 U.S. 364 (1964); United States v.
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however, that the scope of these permissible searches may encompass only the person of the accused and the area within his
immediate control, 6 which includes in some instances the place
where the arrest was made.' 7 These limitations or qualifications
of the exceptions to the general rule were intended to prohibit
the authorities from using the exceptions as a license to permit a
general exploratory search of the person or premises of the
accused.' 8
Extending the concept of permissible searches even further,
the Supreme Court in Rabinowitz v. United States'" upheld the
validity of a search incident to a lawful arrest even though there
was time to secure a search warrant. The Court did not, however,
base its decision on the necessities which were thought to justify
searches incident to arrest, but rather on the ground that the
fourth amendment prohibits only Lmreasonable searches. Rejecting the assumption that all searches conducted without a
proper warrant and not falling within the common law exceptions are unreasonable and therefore prohibited by the amendment, the Court stated that:
The Constitution does not define what are "unreasonable"
searches and, regrettably, in our discipline we have no ready
litmus paper test. The recurring questions of the reasonableness of searches must
find resolution in the facts and circum20
stances of each case.
Although Rabinowitz dealt with a search incident to arrest,
the above quoted language arguably implies that warrantless
searches which are not within the common-law exceptions might
be valid if "reasonable" under the particular circumstances.
Subsequent cases, however, did not immediately expand the
areas of warrantless searches beyond the common-law excep21
tions.

Illustrative of the Court's reluctance to extend the implica22
tions of Rabinowitz was the case of Preston v. United States.
Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56, 68 (1950) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting); State
v. Chinn, 231 Ore. 259, 373 P.2d 392 (1962).
16. Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 3183 (1914).
17. United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56 (1950); Marron v.
United States, 275. U.S. 192 (1927); Agnello v. United States, 269 U.S. 20
(1925).
18. United States v. Lefkowitz, 285 U.S. 452 (1932); Go-Bart Importing Co. v. United States, 282 U.S. 344 (1931).
19. 339 U.S. 56 (1950).
20. Id. at 63.
21. See, e.g., Preston v. United States, 376 U.S. 364 (1964); Ker v.
California, 374 U.S. 23 (1963); Chapman v. United States, 365 U.S. 610
(1961).
22. 376 U.S. 364 (1964).
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In Preston,defendant was arrested on a charge of vagrancy while
seated in his automobile. The vehicle was subsequently taken
into police custody to remove it from the street and was searched
shortly thereafter. Based partially upon the evidence obtained
through this post-arrest search, defendant was convicted of conspiring to rob a federally insured bank. In reversing the conviction, the Supreme Court held that when the search of an
automobile without a warrant was too remote in time or place
to have been made incident to the arrest it failed to meet the
test of reasonableness under the fourth amendment. 23 The
Court reasoned that the normal justifications for allowing contemporaneous searches 24 are absent once the accused has been
placed under arrest and the automobile is in police custody. Because the search was without a warrant and neither of the exceptions to warrantless searches applied, the search was deemed
unreasonable and therefore illegal under the fourth amendment. Preston represents, therefore, an apparent retreat from
the implications of the test of general reasonableness discussed
in Rabinowitz.
The instant case is similar to Preston in that the automobile
was searched some time subsequent to the arrest.2 5 However,
the Court undertook to distinguish Preston on factual grounds.
In Preston the reason the car was being held bore no relationship to the search, and the search was unrelated to the arrest for
vagrancy. In Cooper the automobile was impounded and held
pursuant to a state statute which provided that a vehicle involved in the illegal handling of narcotics was to be held as evidence until a forfeiture had been declared or a release ordered. 26
In addition, the object of the search in Cooper was related to the
accused's arrest on a charge of a narcotics violation. Consequently, the Court in Cooper held that the close relationship of
the search to the nature of the arrest as well as to the reason the
vehicle was in custody validated the search as reasonable within
the spirit and meaning of the fourth amendment.
However, it is arguable that standing alone these distinctions are transparent and unconvincing. It is at once apparent
that the statute under which the vehicle was impounded does
23. Id. at 368.
24. See note 15 supra and accompanying text.
25. In Preston, the car was searched "soon after the men had
been booked at the station." 376 U.S. at 365. In Cooper, "the search
occurred a week after the arrest of petitioner." 386 U.S. at 58.
26. CAL. HEALTH &SAFETY CODE § 11611.
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not specifically authorize its search.27 Rather, the language of
the statute seems to import that such vehicles may be held as
evidence only when such evidence has been found, but in Cooper
the vehicle was first held and then the evidence found. Indeed,
if custody of the car has any relevance, it arguably militates
against the reasonableness of the search for with the man and
the car in police custody, there was no danger that the car would
be removed from the jurisdiction, or that the evidence would be
destroyed. Further, the distinction based on the relationship
between the search and the arrest is unconvincing for in Preston
the Court indicated that even if evidence of the crime of vagrancy
were involved-assuming that there is such a thing-the search
would have been unreasonable. 28 Moreover, the reasoning of
the Preston decision would seem to apply to the Cooper facts
whether the purpose of the search had a relationship to the arrest
or not for even if the search were related to the arrest, there was
no possibility that the evidence would be destroyed once the
defendant was arrested and the car taken into custody.
The Court in Cooper, however, was not addressing itself to
precisely the same issue as it was in Preston. In the latter case
the Court was deciding whether or not the search was reasonably incident to an arrest, while in the former the Court was
dealing with the question of whether the search was reasonable
under the fourth amendment even though it was not incident to
an arrest. 29 Therefore, it is arguable that the Court in Cooper
was attempting to establish that a warrantless search may be
reasonable within the meaning of the fourth amendment even
though it does not fall within the traditional exceptions of
searches incident to a lawful arrest or searches of movable vehicles. Unlike Preston, which relied solely on necessity for justification to permit warrantless searches, the Court in Cooper
adopted the test of general reasonableness established in Rabinowitz and extended the scope of permissible warrantless searches
beyond the common law exceptions besed on necessity.
Although Cooper is the first case to explicitly make this departure, searches under somewhat similar factual situations have
been upheld in the past. Although most prior Supreme Court
decisions speak in terms of searches incident to arrest, the traditional justification for permitting such searches, as set out in
27. This interpretation of the statute was rendered by the state
court. People v. Cooper, 234 Cal. App. 2d 587, 44 Cal. Rptr. 483 (1965).
28. Preston v. United States, 376 U.S. 364, 368 (1964).
29. Cooper v. California, 386 U.S. 58, 61 (1967).
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the Preston decision, is frequently lacking. 30 In addition, several
distinguishing the
lower courts have reached similar conclusions,
3
Prestondecision on factual grounds. '
The fact that the sweeping holding of Preston was not entirely consistent with the decisions in prior cases, and the reluctance of lower courts to strictly apply the reasoning of Preston
may have had a significant bearing on the Cooper decision. However, the decision may represent no more than a statement of
reality for, although the Court in Preston defended the contemporaneous search doctrine on the grounds of necessity, subsequent cases indicate that the real justification is the convenience and expediency of allowing a reasonable search following
32
an arrest.
The difficulty with the doctrine announced in Cooper lies
in the fact that there are no standards based on established reasoning which can be used to determine the legitimacy of a particular search. Without guidelines, law enforcement officers
have no method other than intuition by which to determine
whether or not a search and seizure is legal. Based on Cooper,
it appears that a car may be searched if it is being held as evi33
dence of the crime and/or is subject to forfeiture for the crime,
but such a conclusion should be tempered in light of the fact
that in Cooper there was a statute which specifically authorized
the authorities to impound the vehicle. Further, the Cooper
decision places great weight upon the close relationship between
the nature of the arrest and the objectives of the search. Such
30. See, e.g., Harris v. United States, 331 U.S. 145 (1947), where all

four rooms of an apartment were thoroughly searched for five hours

while the suspect was handcuffed. It is difficult to see where such a
search was necessary for the protection of evidence or police, or to prevent escape, any more so than in Preston. See also Ker v. California,
374 U.S. 23 (1963); Abel v. United States, 362 U.S. 217 (1960); United
States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56 (1950); Marron v. United States,
275 U.S. 192 (1927).
31. For a collection and discussion of cases distinguishing Preston,
see People v. Webb, 56 Cal. Rptr. 902, 424 P.2d 342 (Sup. Ct. 1967).

32. Except for Frankfurter's dissent in United States v. Rabinowitz,

339 U.S. 56, 68 (1950), and the Preston case, the cases generally state
that the officers have a right to search without a warrant, to seize
things connected with the crimes, not because it is necessary, but because it is reasonable. See, e.g., United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56
(1950); Marron v. United States, 275 U.S. 192 (1927); Agnello v. United
States, 269 U.S. 20 (1925).

33. A number of cases have distinguished Preston, when the car in

question was itself evidence of a crime rather than a container of
incriminating articles. See Trotter v. Stephens, 241 F. Supp. 33 (E.D.
Ark. 1965); People v. Talbot, 64 Cal. 2d 691, 414 P.2d 633, 51 Cal. Rptr.
417 (1966); Johnson v. State, 238 Md. 528, 209 A.2d 765 (1965).
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a relationship should, therefore, be a determining agent. Lastly,
factors relied upon by lower courts which distinguished Preston
prior to the Cooper decision may also be relevant in implementing
the Cooper doctrine. Such factors have included the proximity
of time and place to the arrest, 34 the fact that a subsequent
search was part of a continuing series of events between the
arrest and search, 35 the difficulty or inadvisability of conducting
a search at the time and place of arrest, 36 and the amount of protection needed to ensure against any third party's tampering with
the evidence. 37 Although the decisions refer to the fact that such
searches are reasonably incident to arrest, and therefore reasonable, it appears that under Cooper they may be valid if reasonable, even though not incident to arrest.
The Cooper decision does not necessarily alter the decisions
presently rendered by lower courts, but it definitely establishes
that a search need not be consistent with the former justifications
for searches incident to an arrest to be reasonable under the
fourth amendment. At this time, however, it is at best conjecture to predict what will ultimately be the correct interpretation and the proper scope of the Cooper decision, as its ambiguity
and its departure from the reasoning of Preston will doubtless
result in a variety of interpretations by the lower courts. 38
Should chaos result it can only be hoped that the Supreme
Court will undertake to clarify the problem which it has created.

34. Cooper indicates that the lack of proximity of time and place
to the arrest is not necessarily fatal to the validity of the search.
This factor may nevertheless be significant in determining whether the
search is incident to an arrest and if not, whether it is reasonable
even though not incident to an arrest. See Crawford v. Bannan, 336
F.2d 505 (6th Cir. 1964); People v. Robinson, 62 Cal. 2d 889, 402 P.2d
834, 44 Cal. Rptr. 762 (1965).
35. See Price v. United States, 348 F.2d 68, 70 (D.C. Cir. 1965);
Arwine v. Bannan, 346 F.2d 458 (6th Cir. 1965); Trotter v. Stephens, 241
F. Supp. 33 (E.D. Ark. 1965).

36. See e.g., Arwine v. Bannan, 346 F.2d 458 (6th Cir. 1965); People
v. Montgomery, 21 App. Div. 2d 904, 252 N.Y.S.2d 194, 195 (1964); State
v. McCreary, 142 N.W.2d 240 (S.D. 1966).
37. See, e.g., Arwine v. Bannan, 346 F.2d 458 (6th Cir. 1965); State
v. McCreary, 142 N.W.2d 240 (S.D. 1966); People v. Talbot, 64 Cal. 2d
691, 414 P.2d 633, 51 Cal. Rptr. 417 (1966).
38. In People v. Webb, 424 P.2d 342, 56 Cal. Rptr. 902 (Sup. Ct.
1967), the majority felt that the controlling consideration in Cooper is
that the statute required the vehicle to be seized and held as evidence.
Four dissenting justices in Cooper and one concurring justice in Webb
interpreted Cooper as overruling Preston.

